Kuria proposes separate publication of electronic and paper presidential tallies

Moses Kuria has proposed publishing two presidential election tallies in 2027: an electronic count labelled unverified and a second count based on physical results forms checked at the national tallying centre. His intervention puts the relationship between speed and verification at the centre of the debate over how Kenyans should follow election results.

The former Cabinet Secretary's proposal was reported by The Star on 24 October, drawing on a statement on his X account. It is a political proposal, not an announced IEBC operating procedure. No adoption of the proposed system has been established for this report.

Kuria envisages a public electronic tally assembled as constituency results arrive, alongside a tally updated after the physical forms have been verified. He argues that comparison could reveal differences between the two records. He also suggests that an absence of discrepancies in 2027 could inform a more electronic process in 2032. That future change would require its own decisions; a successful comparison would not automatically amend election law.

What the existing records show

The commission's 2022 presidential election procedures provide a useful historical reference. They describe a results trail beginning with Form 34A at the polling station, continuing through constituency aggregation on Form 34B, and culminating in the national Form 34C. Copies and scanned records allow different participants to examine the underlying returns.

The documents show why a national total is only one part of verification. A tally must remain traceable to the polling-station record from which each figure originates. If an aggregate changes, the supporting documents are needed to explain which return changed, what was corrected and whether the correction was properly authorised.

Those were the arrangements documented for 2022. They should not be read as a complete announcement of the technology, staffing or operating procedures that IEBC will use in 2027. Kuria's proposal would have to be assessed against the framework applicable to that election, including any relevant judicial decisions and formally adopted regulations.

Verification has a constitutional purpose

Article 138 of the Constitution assigns the commission the tasks of tallying and verifying the count after votes have been counted at polling stations, and then declaring the result. The chairperson must declare the presidential result within seven days of the election and notify the Chief Justice and incumbent President in writing.

The winning threshold has two components. A candidate must receive more than half of the votes cast nationally and at least 25 per cent of the votes cast in each of more than half of the counties. A nationwide running total therefore cannot, by itself, demonstrate that both constitutional tests have been met.

If no candidate meets the conditions, the Constitution provides for a fresh election within 30 days, with participation determined by the first round's leading vote totals. This makes the completeness of the count important: a display covering only some constituencies may be informative, but it cannot substitute for the completed process required to establish a winner.

Article 86 adds broader standards for the voting system. It must be simple, accurate, verifiable, secure, accountable and transparent. The same article requires prompt announcement of polling-station results, open and accurate collation by returning officers, and safeguards for election materials. Any proposed display should be judged against these requirements together, rather than against speed alone.

Lessons from the last election

The European Union's final observation report on the 2022 election discusses both the transparency of the national tallying process and errors found during scrutiny. It recorded arithmetic discrepancies in 21 of the 290 constituency Forms 34B, involving 4,023 votes, while finding that these did not affect the outcome.

That historical finding explains why comparing records can have value without making every difference evidence of manipulation. A discrepancy needs investigation and a documented resolution. Its existence alone does not establish intent, and its significance depends on the affected records and the verified correction.

For two public tallies, clear labelling would be particularly important. The displayed coverage, time of update and verification status would need to be understandable. Otherwise, viewers could mistake an earlier, incomplete electronic total for a competing declaration or compare totals covering different sets of constituencies.

What remains to be decided

Kuria's suggestion leaves operational questions for the commission and other institutions responsible for the electoral framework. These include which document feeds each display, how corrections are recorded, who authorises them and how the public can trace a corrected figure to its source. His reported proposal does not supply a complete technical specification for those tasks.

Public access to results and the legal declaration of a winner serve related but distinct purposes. Access enables scrutiny while counting proceeds; declaration follows the required verification and constitutional tests. A system can improve the first without removing the obligations attached to the second.

The next substantive development would be a documented response from IEBC or a formal proposal setting out how dual tallies would operate. Until then, Kuria has added an idea to the transparency debate, while the commission's duty to verify the count remains the central benchmark against which it must be assessed.